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INTRODUCTION  
George Orwell once wrote in his novel, 1984, that “[i]t was terribly 
dangerous to let your thoughts wander when you were in any public place 
or within a range of a telescreen. The small things could give you away. A 
nervous tic, an unconscious look of anxiety, a habit of muttering to yourself 
– anything that carried with it the suggestion of abnormality, of having 
something to hide. In any case, to wear an improper expression on your 
face [] was a punishable offense.”1 The 1984 novel was written in the year 
1949, a time long before the advancement of the current technology in use 
today,2 yet Orwell was fearful, as his writing demonstrated, of what the 
future could hold—of the potential for modern societies to implement 
technology with enormous investigative and authoritative capabilities.3 The 
1984 novel displayed themes of totalitarianism and of a dystopian future, 
where an all-seeing leader known as “Big Brother” becomes a universal 
symbol for intrusive and oppressive government oversight.4 Orwell was not 
necessarily a prophet, but instead a writer, who recognized that a 
government’s power to control an individuals’ actions and thoughts could 
be drastic for society.5  
Fast forward to the present day. The year is 2020. Technology has 
expanded at an explosive rate and has revolutionized the world we live in 
today.6 Modern technology continues to pave the way for providing 
substantial tools and resources at our fingertips. Consider how far society 
has come in the past fifty years. What was once only a dream of 
technological capabilities, portrayed only in science fiction novels, has now 
 
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 65 (1949).   
2. George Orwell’s “1984” is Published, HISTORY (Nov. 13, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/george-orwells-nineteen-eighty-four-
is-published [https://perma.cc/P5U8-JW74]. 
3.     See ORWELL, supra note 1. 
4. See George Orwell’s “1984” is Published, supra note 2. 




4-EHSY].   
6. Leslie Wilder, 7 Ways Technology Has Changed Our Lives, THRIVE 
GLOB. (May 29, 2019), https://thriveglobal.com/stories/7-ways-technology-has-
changed-our-lives/ [https://perma.cc/5Q38-ZYML]. 
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come to life.7 Developments in technology have led to improved 
communication, better home entertainment, improved housing and lifestyle, 
and convenience with daily tasks.8 Yet, like anything else, with the good 
comes the bad. Business Insider noted how, from a consumer standpoint, 
the use of technology has been detrimental to physical health, mental 
health, relationships, and the ability to interact face to face with other 
people.9  
Likewise, the increase of technology has largely changed the nature 
of the relationship between the government and its citizens as it relates to 
surveillance of movements throughout daily life. Today, 600 separate 
United States government agencies employ the use of facial recognition 
technology.10 This technology uses cameras to capture images of the person 
and her biometric identifying data.11 The captured biometric data is then 
converted into a template, which is then compared to preexisting images of 
the person to determine her identity.12 The use of facial recognition 
technology has begun to fuel debates over its unregulated use which has 
been termed a “massive breach of privacy and trust.”13 Others defend the 
use of facial recognition technology as an important tool for stopping 
crime.14 To be sure, the lack of regulation in the government’s use of facial 
recognition technology raises questions and concerns. Is this technology the 
“Big Brother” that Orwell’s 1984 novel warned us against? Do individuals 
 
7. Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, Concerns About the Future of People’s 
Well Being, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet
/2018/04/17/concerns-about-the-future-of-peoples-well-being/ [https://perma.cc/C
GX9-MWWB]. 
8. Zlatko Stojanov, The 6 Main Ways Technology Impacts Your Daily Life, 
TECH.CO (Feb. 23, 2017, 8:30 PM), https://tech.co/news/6-main-ways-technology-
impacts-daily-life-2017-02 [https://perma.cc/7PYL-S37U]. 
9. Chelsea Greenwood, 9 Subtle Ways Technology is Making Humanity 
Worse, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2019, 10:20 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/technology-negative-bad-effects-society-2019-8 [https://perma.cc/CQB8-HV9M]. 
10. Editorial Board, A Scary New Facial Recognition Tool Underlines the 




11. Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where 
Will It Take Us?, A.B.A. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
publications/criminal-justice-magazine/2019/spring/facial-recognition-technology/ 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G39V-LGBY]. 
12. Id. 
13. Drew Harwell, Facial-Recognition Use by Federal Agencies Draws 
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have privacy rights and expectations against the use of this technology? If 
so, what are the appropriate regulatory measures for protecting privacy 
rights?   
This note serves as a call to action imploring legislatures, 
specifically the United States Congress, to adopt comprehensive statutory 
regulation to regulate the governmental use of facial recognition technology 
and the compilation of biometric data.  This note will proceed in five parts. 
Following this Section, Section I dives into an overview and discussion on 
the details of facial recognition technology, including a summary of 
biometric data and the current uses of facial recognition technology in the 
United States. Section II discusses key aspects of current state laws that 
regulate facial recognition technology. Section II transitions into exploring 
current proposed federal law that will regulate the commercial use—not 
governmental use—of facial recognition technology. Section III reviews 
Fourth Amendment law and constitutional requirements. Section IV applies 
these Fourth Amendment principles to the issue of a government’s 
unregulated use of facial recognition technology. Section V proposes 
legislation to further protect American citizens’ privacy rights. Secondary 
to the proposed legislation, Section V will further examine policy 
considerations and arguments for extending protection.  
I.  BACKGROUND ON FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, DATA 
COLLECTION, AND CURRENT USES OF FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY 
A.  What is Facial Recognition Technology?  
Facial recognition technology is a method for identifying and 
verifying the identity of an individual using their face and its distinguishing 
features.15 This technology falls under the grander purview of biometric 
technologies, which involves a five-part process.16 First, a sensor collects 
information on a particular characteristic of an individual and then converts 
that information into a digital format.17 From there, signal processing 
algorithms convert the digital format to a digital biometric template.18 
These computer algorithms, within the software applications, can measure 
specific details such as the distance between the eyes, the width of the nose, 
or the length of the jawline.19 Once the new template is produced, it is 
 
15. Face Recognition, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.eff.org/pages/face-recognition [https://perma.cc/P5DL-97DW]. 
16. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:4 Biometrics: A 
General Overview of Biometric Technology, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, 
Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 11. 
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stored in a data storage system to allow for later comparison against new 
biometric templates that are generated in the future.20 At a later time, either 
the same sensor or a separate sensor will collect the same individual’s 
biometric identifying information, using the same particular biometric 
authentication system, which then forms a new template and compares the 
new template to existing templates by using a matching algorithm.21 The 
results from the matching algorithm are then used to decide the identity of 
the individual.22 
This five-step identifying process serves two distinct objectives: 
namely, (1) ascertaining whether the individual is whom she purports to be, 
or (2) attempting to determine the individual’s identity.23 In other words, 
the first function of facial recognition technology seeks to verify the 
identity of an individual by asking the question of: Are you whom you 
claim you are?24 The first function commonly involves one-to-one 
matching,25 which scans an individual’s biometric trait that is then 
compared to existing templates on that individual.26 Verification often 
proves to be an easy process because these persons have already provided 
their biometric identifying information once. Thus, all that is sought is to 
determine whether the person is who they say they are.27 For example, 
facial recognition technology software often takes photos from social media 
sites or other online websites, where social media users willingly submit 
photos of their faces.28 One common example of current uses is Facebook, 
where users submit photos and then, using Facebook facial recognition 
technology, tag their suggested friends in the photo.29 
Second, facial recognition technology seeks to determine the 
identity of an individual by asking the question of: Who are you?30 This 
function is a much more complex process than the first function. Like the 
first function, the second function involves one-to-one matching, but 
identification compares the newly created biometric trait with an entire 
database.31 The goal with identification is to find a matching template, if 
 









29. Id.; CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:45 Biometrics and 
Social Media, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2019). 
30. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 16. 
31. Id. 
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one exists, to determine the identity of the individual.32 A more detailed 
analysis regarding biometric data collection is discussed next. 
B.  Facial Recognition Technology and Collection of Biometric Data 
Touched on above, facial recognition technology systems collect 
distinct facial characteristics, known as biometrics,33 that are then compared 
to pre-existing biometric templates using facial recognition software 
applications.34 The term biometrics can be used interchangeably to describe 
a (1) characteristic or a (2) process.35 Biometrics as a characteristic are  
“measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral 
characteristics capable of being used for automated recognition.”36 
Biometric data as characteristics roughly fall into two categories: (1) 
physical identifiers and (2) human identifiers. Typical physical identifiers 
include fingerprint recognition, hand geometry, retina scans, iris scans, 
voice recognition, face recognition, and vascular or vein recognition. It is 
estimated that at least 14% of private companies currently use such 
technology to obtain biometric identifying information.37  
Biometrics can also be described as a process that employs 
“automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable 
biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics.”38 
More recently, the focus of biometric identifying technology and its uses 
has focused on collecting information on behavioral identifiers.39 Where 
this technology once only had the capability of capturing one’s physical 
identifying qualities, it has now grown to capabilities of allowing users to 
gain valuable information on a person’s typing patterns, physical movement 
patterns, navigation patterns, and engagement of technology patterns.40  
 
32. Id. 
33. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:1 Biometrics: 
Introduction, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2019). 
34.  Id.  
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:44 Biometrics: Private 
Industry Use, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated 
Nov. 2019). 
38. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 33. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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C.  History of Biometric Data Collection and Use of Facial Recognition 
Technology  
Although facial recognition technology is a relatively new 
phenomenon, the use of biometric data, and its form of identification, has 
been around for centuries.41 The federal government first began to obtain 
biometric data in 1907 when the Department of Justice established a Bureau 
of Criminal Identification based on fingerprint data.42 By the 1960’s, the 
federal government’s use of compiling biometric data had become a big 
emphasis with federal protection agencies. Specifically, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation began to create an automated technology system for a 
database of fingerprints with the ability of comparison.43  
Around this same time, private industries, like government 
agencies, began to invest heavily in developing new biometric identification 
technologies.44 By the early 1990s, facial recognition software began to 
increasingly develop, and by 1993, the Department of Defense initiated its 
Face Recognition Technology program.45 By as early as 1996, the United 
States Army implemented real-time face identification.46  
Early 21st century uses of facial recognition technology remained 
primarily in the national defense sphere.47 In 2000, the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) created the Human Identification at a 
Distance Program,48 which sought to create an algorithm to identify 
individuals from up to 150 meters away by using face and gait (a person’s 
manner of walking) technologies.49 The push for the development of facial 
recognition technology software greatly increased after the 9/11 terrorist 
attack.50 Post-9/11 efforts would act as a strong impetus in developing and 
implementing new biometric identification systems to collect, retain, and 
share individual biometric data.51   
The first reported use of wide-scale biometric collection through 
facial recognition technology occurred at the 2001 Super Bowl in Tampa, 
Florida.52 As excited fans passed through the gates outside the stadium, 
 
41. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:2 Biometrics: A 
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video surveillance captured images of attendees and sent them to a 
computer.53 Once the computer received these images, the images would 
then be matched to law enforcement’s existing agency biometric data 
files.54 Unknown to the public at this time is that for many years, biometric 
technology had been in use throughout the law enforcement sector, 
including aiding border control efforts, overseeing driver’s license 
applications and the photos taken, for security clearance purposes, and 
preventing welfare fraud.55 Privacy law scholars Fishman and McKenna 
would ultimately call the evolution of biometric identifying information and 
its use in stopping crime “remarkable.”56 
Since the inception of facial recognition technology, its uses and 
success have recognized significant advances.57 This has largely come due 
to social media sites use of facial recognition technology, the growth of 
smartphone applications, the successful implementation of facial 
recognition in airports, and nationally centralized collection of facial 
biometric data in criminal and military investigations.58 Moreover, in a 
commercial setting, these low-cost facial recognition technologies are being 
developed and put into use at an astounding pace.59 As of current, 
consumer-grade cameras with built-in face detection are readily available 
for sale to consumers.60 These advances and improvements are backed by 
statistics as well.61 The technology error rate has recognized 50% drops in 
error every two years.62 What history shows is that the types of biometric 
technology in use is greatly expanding at a rapid rate. Discussed below is 







57. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:11 Biometrics 
Identification: Facial or Face Recognition, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, 
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II.  CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATION OF FACIAL 
RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY  
States have led the way in regulating the collection and compilation 
of biometric data.63 However, the current state laws that do exist regulate 
the commercial64—not governmental65—use of facial recognition 
technology and collection of biometric identifying information.66 Illinois 
was the first state to adopt a comprehensive act that would regulate the 
commercial use of facial recognition technology.67 Texas and Washington 
soon thereafter followed Illinois’ footsteps in developing comprehensive 
“biometric” legislation.68 Other states have begun to follow suit in 
proposing legislation to address the use and collection of biometric data.69  
The discussion below will touch on the Illinois statute and its key 
provisions. Following thereafter will be a brief overview of other 
comprehensive state laws enacted by Texas and Washington with their 
distinguishing characteristics.  
With respect to federal law, there is currently no regulation of 
commercial use of facial recognition technology nor governmental use of 
technology. The current federal comprehensive act that has been proposed 
is the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019 (CFRPA), 
 
63. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:30 Biometrics and 
State Legislation: An Overview, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw 
(database updated Nov. 2019). 
64. The term “commercial” refers to business uses of the collection of 
biometric data. For example, commercial uses would pertain to typical stores such 
as Target, Walmart, or Home Depot, and their use of technology that obtains and 
compiles biometric data. See generally Section I(C) for a discussion of current uses 
of technology that obtains biometric information. 
65. The term “governmental use” refers to all government use including 
federal, state, and local governments. Governmental use is use of technology that 
obtains and compiles biometric data for purposes of stopping crime. Governmental 
use is the focus of this note.  
66. See generally Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 14/15 (2016); Texas Biometric Identifiers, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 
503.001 (West 2015)(regulating commercial entity collection and use of biometric 
data); Washington Biometric Identifiers, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.375.020 
(West Supp. 2020). 
67. See generally CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, §§ 31:30.10 
Illinois: Biometric Information Privacy Act, 31:30.20 Texas: Capture or Use of 
Biometric Identifier Act, 31:30.30 Washington: Biometric Identifiers Statute, in 
WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019) 
(describing how Illinois enacted comprehensive biometric legislation and other 
states soon began to follow suit), FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63. 
68. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63; FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 
67, §§ 31:30.10, 31:30.20, 31:30.30. 
69. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63. 
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which like state law, only regulates commercial use of facial recognition 
technology.70 The CFRPA specifically exempts governmental use of this 
technology.71 After discussing state law, this note’s discussion will turn to 
address the current state of the CFRPA and its key provisions.  
A.  Illinois’ Biometric Privacy Information Act (“BIPA”) 
Illinois became the first state to pass a comprehensive biometric 
data privacy statute when it adopted the Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act (BIPA).72 Illinois enacted BIPA in response to major national 
corporations choosing the city of Chicago as pilot test sites for the use of 
biometric facilitated transactions.73 
BIPA idealized obviating the likelihood of biometric transactions 
with the ultimate goal of providing for the “public welfare, security, [and] 
safety, [which would] be served by regulating the collection, use, 
safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of biometric 
identifiers and information.”74 The Illinois law governs two specific 
categories of data: “biometric identifiers” and “biometric information.”75 
The first category of biometric identifiers includes data such as a 
fingerprint, facial geometry, and a retina or iris scan.76 The latter category, 
biometric information, “means any information, regardless of how it is 
captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s biometric 
identifier used to identify an individual.”77  
BIPA makes it illegal for a private entity to obtain a person’s 
biometric identifier or information unless the entity: (1) informs the person 
in writing that his or her biometric information is being collected or stored; 
(2) discloses the specific purpose and length for which the data is being 
collected and stored; and (3) receives a written release from that person to 
collect and store his or her biometric data.78  
If and after the requirements for obtaining biometric data have been 
met, private entities must still meet stringent requirements regarding the 
 
70. Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/847/text 
[https://perma.cc/G46D-MUVJ]. 
71. Id. at § 2(3)(B)(i)–(iv). 
72. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 67, §§ 31:30.10, 31:30.20, 
31.30.30; FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 63. 
73. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 67, § 31:30.10. 
74. Id. 
75. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10 (Illinois Biometric Information 
Privacy Act) (West 2008). 
76. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10. 
77. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10. 
78. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(b)(1)–(3). 
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disclosure of the obtained data.79 First, these private entities may not “sell, 
lease, trade, or otherwise profit from a person’s biometric identifier or 
biometric information.”80 Second, the private entity may not “disclose, 
redisclose, or otherwise disseminate a person’s or a customer’s biometric 
identifier or biometric information” unless: (1) the person consents to the 
disclosure; (2) the subject requests or authorizes a financial transaction, the 
completion of which requires the disclosure of biometric data; (3) the 
disclosure is required by State or federal law or municipal ordinance; or (4) 
the disclosure is required pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena.81  
The underlying goal of BIPA is to ensure transparency with 
consumers regarding private entities obtaining this information and the 
information’s use.82 Because of this objective, BIPA further requires these 
private entities to establish and publicize a written policy for retention of 
the information and guidelines for which the information is to be destroyed, 
which at the longest, can be stored for three years.83 Moreover, the storage 
of this data must be sufficiently protected from the eyes of third parties, just 
as any other confidential information would be protected.84  
BIPA creates a private right of action for “any person aggrieved” 
by violations of the Act.85 The penalty imposed on the private entities varies 
and increases in degree. The degree of the penalty depends on the private 
entity’s culpability, that is, the requisite mental state of the actor. For 
example, the penalty will be lower if the actor is found to have acted 
negligently, as opposed to recklessly or intentionally.86 The Act further 
allows for other forms of relief, including injunctive relief.87  
B.  Subsequent State Law Development  
Other states have begun to follow Illinois’ steps in regulating the 
commercial use of technology that collects and retains biometric 
information. Among the other states that have since undertaken these 
regulating efforts, Texas and Washington are two other states that have 
developed comprehensive biometric legislation. In many respects, the 
Texas and Washington acts are very similar to BIPA, Illinois’ biometric 
legislation. In other regards, they do have some distinguishing provisions 
which are worth mentioning.  
 
79. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(c). 
80. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(c). 
81. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(d)(1)–(4). 
82. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 67, § 31:30.10. 
83. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(a); see also FISHMAN & MCKENNA, 
supra note 67, § 31:30.10. 
84. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/15(e)(1). 
85. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20. 
86. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20(1)–(2). 
87. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/20(4). 
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Texas enacted the Capture or Use of Information Identifier Act 
(CUBI) in 2009, one year after Illinois enacted BIPA.88 CUBI is similar to 
BIPA in that CUBI generally prohibits private commercial entities from 
collecting, compiling, and retaining an individual’s biometric data unless 
otherwise first notifying and obtaining consent to the data collection.89 
CUBI differs from BIPA in four main respects. First, CUBI does not 
require notice and consent to be in writing.90 Second, CUBI does not 
require private entities to disclose the purpose for collection of the 
biometric data.91 Third, CUBI does not require the private entity to specify 
how long the data will be stored.92 Fourth, unlike BIPA, CUBI does not 
provide a private right of action for violations of the Act and instead only 
allows the Texas Attorney General’s Office to recover civil penalties.93 
Washington was the third state to follow Illinois and Texas’ 
footsteps by passing legislation in 2017 to regulate biometric data and the 
commercial use and collection of the data.94 Washington’s law is largely 
similar to BIPA and CUBI. Like BIPA and CUBI, the Washington Act 
requires notice and consent before biometric identifying information may 
be stored for a commercial purpose or sold to third-parties.95 Washington 
law differs from BIPA in that it does not provide for a private right of 
action.96 Instead, the Washington law is similar to  CUBI which only 
permits the attorney general’s office to bring causes of action based upon 
statutory violations.97  
Other states continue to make significant strides in enacting 
legislation that would regulate the use and collection of biometric data, 
either through a biometric-specific statute or by amending existing 
legislation to provide protection.98 Among these states include Alaska, 
 
88. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 67, § 31:30.20. 
89. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b)(1)–(2). 
90. See generally TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a)–(e) (lacking a 
notice provision and written consent provision). 
91. See generally TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(a)–(e) (lacking a 
disclosure of purpose provision). 
92. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(b)–(c); but see TEX. BUS. & 
COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(c)(3) (requiring that biometric identifying information 
be destroyed “within a reasonable time” but no later than one year after the 
expiration of the purpose for collection of the information). 
93. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d). It is worth noting as well that 
the Texas civil penalties are much higher than those provided for in BIPA. CUBI 
provides for remedies of $25,000 per each violation by a commercial entity. 
94. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 67, § 31:30.30. 
95. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020(1)–(3). 
96. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.030(2). 
97. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.030(2). 
98. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 31:32 Pending 
Legislation, in WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 
2019). 
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California, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New York.99 Similar to BIPA, CUBI, 
and the Washington Act, all states seek to provide a general prohibition 
against the commercial collection and use of biometric data without some 
form of notice and consent.100 The differences that do exist among other 
state-proposed legislation relate to the scope of the definitions of certain 
terms relating to biometric identification and the requisite penalties for 
violation of the statute.101  
C.  Proposed Federal Law: Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act 
of 2019 (“CFRPA”) 
Congress has followed the footsteps of Illinois, Texas, and 
Washington. On March 14, 2019, Senator Roy Blunt introduced the 
Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019 bill, a proposed law 
that would regulate the collection and use of biometric information in the 
commercial setting.102 As of current, the bill has been read twice and has 
since been referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation.103  
The Act’s objective is to “prohibit certain entities from using facial 
recognition technology to identify or track an end user without obtaining 
the affirmative consent of the end user . . . .”104 Unlike the aforementioned 
state laws, CFRPA provides protections against only the commercial use of 
facial recognition technology, not other technologies, which is much 
narrower in scope than state laws like BIPA and CUBI.105 However, in 
many respects, CFRPA is similar to BIPA and CUBI. Like BIPA and 
CUBI, CFRPA focuses only on commercial use, collection, and 
compilation of biometric identifying information by private entities through 
the use of facial recognition technology.106 Importantly, the regulation 
excludes the federal government, state and local government, national 
 
99. Id.  
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019, S. 847, 116th Cong. 
(2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/847/all-actions?
overview=closed&KWICView=false (last visited Jan. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/3
G2C-VCRF]. 
103. Id. 
104. See id. (stating “[t]o prohibit certain entities from using facial recognition 
technology to identify or track an ender user without obtaining the affirmative 
consent of the end user, and for other purposes.”). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. § 2(3) (defining “covered entities” to include only commercial 
businesses).  
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security agency, and intelligence agency uses of facial recognition 
technology.107  
CFRPA provides that it is unlawful for a private entity to 
knowingly use facial recognition technology to collection facial recognition 
data unless the private entity first obtains “affirmative consent.”108 The Act 
defines “affirmative consent” to be an “individual, voluntary, and explicit 
agreement to the collection and data use policies of [] [private entity].”109 
“To the extent possible, if facial recognition technology is present,” the 
private entity must provide the person with notice that facial recognition 
technology is being used.110 Included with the notice must be 
documentation that provides general information regarding the capabilities 
and limitations of the facial recognition technology.111 Once information is 
obtained, private entities are not allowed to share the data with an 
“unaffiliated third party” without receiving “affirmative consent,” separate 
from the affirmative consent already required to collect biometric 
identifying information through facial recognition technology.112  
With regard to providing information about the notice, private 
entities must describe the specific practices regarding the collection, 
storage, and use of facial recognition data.113 This description must include 
the purpose for collection of the data, the process for data retention, and the 
ability to review or correct, if any, the information obtained.114  
Enforcement of the CFRPA is slightly larger in scope than those 
provisions contained in BIPA and CUBI because the CFRPA has the 
federal law component. A violation of the general prohibitions mentioned 
above115 are treated as violations of unfair or deceptive acts of trade as 
defined by the Federal Trade Commission Act.116 CFRPA further provides 
that attorneys general of the state may bring a civil action on behalf of the 
residents of the state to seek “appropriate relief.”117 
States and the federal government have taken significant strides to 
regulate the collection and compilation of biometric identifying information 
by commercial businesses, exemplifying the idea that such unregulated 
compilation of information implicates privacy concerns. Accordingly, the 
question arises of whether unregulated governmental collection and 
compilation of biometric data similarly implicates the same privacy 
 
107. S. 847 § 2(3)(B)(i)–(iv). 
108. S. 847 § 3(a)(1)(A). 
109. S. 847 § 2(1). 
110. S. 847 § 3(a)(1)(B)(i). 
111. S. 847 § 3(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
112. S. 847 § 3(a)(4). 
113. S. 847 § 3(b)(1). 
114. S. 847 § 3(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
115. See S. 847 § 3.  
116. S. 847 § 4(a)–(b)(1)–(2). 
117. S. 847 § 4(c)(1). 
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concerns afforded by Fourth Amendment protections. Section III briefly 
provides an overview of Fourth Amendment law, and Section IV explores 
whether this unregulated use violates Fourth Amendment protections.  
III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT TESTS AND REQUIREMENTS 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”118 These words enumerated within the text of the 
Fourth Amendment are words of limitation.119 Whereas the Fourth 
Amendment only applies to actions taken by state actors, law enforcement 
practices are not required to be reasonable unless a “search” or “seizure has 
occurred.”120 Therefore, a discussion on “what police activities, under what 
circumstances and infringing upon what areas and interests, constitute 
either a search or seizure within the meaning of that Amendment” 121 is 
essential in determining whether the Fourth Amendment is implicated 
through unregulated governmental use of facial recognition technology and 
the compilation of biometric data. 
At the outset, defining a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment 
context has not been a source of difficulty that courts have had to grapple 
with.122 Generally, a “seizure” occurs within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when a state actor acts by “physically taking and removing 
tangible personal property.”123 Along these same lines, the Supreme Court 
has further stated that a “seizure” of property occurs when “there is some 
meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interest in that 
property.”124 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court and lower courts have 
experienced great difficulty in defining the term “search” within the Fourth 
Amendment context.125 Under a traditional approach, the term “search” is 
said to imply “some exploratory investigation, or an invasion and quest, a 
look for or seeking out . . . .”126 In the early 1900’s, the Court would define 
 
118. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 




121. Id. at 562–63. 
122. Id. at 563. 
123. Id. (quoting 68 AM. JUR. 2D SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 8 (1973)); see 
also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (stating that “a seizure contemplates a 
forcible dispossession of the owner”). 
124. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 563–64 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 
466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). 
125. Id. at 573.  
126. Id. (quoting C.J.S., SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 1 (1952)). 
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searches as physical intrusions into a “constitutionally protected area.”127 
These constitutionally protected areas included areas that were textually 
enumerated within the Fourth Amendment such as “persons,” which would 
include bodies,128 clothing,129 and more. Moreover, “houses” were protected 
and would include apartments,130 hotels,131 garages,132 and other living 
arrangements.  Where these early Fourth Amendment Court opinions drew 
largely on property law concepts and physical intrusions of one’s property, 
the traditional property view, as the sole view of Fourth Amendment rights, 
would change with the Court’s “landmark decision”133 in Katz v. United 
States.134 Katz would rapidly become the basis of a new test135 for 
determining what was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and would expand the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.136 
Katz would be the dominating standard for over fifty years until 2013, 
where the historic property-based approach for determining what actions 
amounted to a “search” would make its return in United States v. Jones.137 
Current Fourth Amendment law requires application of both the Katz test 
and the Jones test to determine whether a “search” has occurred, and both 
tests have been further refined with more recent Court opinions. For these 
reasons, the analysis below will provide a brief overview of the Katz test 
and the Jones test and discuss what is required by both tests to make a 
government action a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.  
A.  The Katz Test  
In Katz v. United States, FBI agents attached an electronic 
recording and listening device to a public telephone that was used by 
Katz.138 The electronic recording device revealed illegal acts by Katz and 
led to him being indicted on eight separate counts of transmitting wagering 
 
127. Id. at 575 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961)); 
see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 (1967); Lanza v. New York, 370 
U.S. 139, 142–43 (1962). 
128. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966). 
129. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90, 97 (1964). 
130. See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158, 158 (1964). 
131. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). 
132. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932). 
133. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 576 (quoting Michael D. Granston, Note, 
From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth Amendment 
Protection, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 968, 968 (1968)). 
134. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
135. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 580. 
136. Id. at 582. 
137. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
138. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
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information.139 On writ of certiorari, Katz challenged the constitutionality 
of the government’s use of the electronic recording device and argued that 
use of the device constituted a “search” and violated his Fourth Amendment 
protections against unreasonable searches.140 
The Court agreed, finding that “[t]he Government’s activities in 
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the 
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth 
and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”141 Justice Harlan, concurring, would formulate a two-part 
test, the Katz test, that would come to be used by the Court over the course 
of the next fifty years and is still in use today.142 The two-part test for 
determining whether a search has occurred in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment requires that: (1) the aggrieved person has demonstrated an 
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation of 
privacy must be one that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”143 
The Court, in subsequent decisions, has further expanded upon both 
requirements of the Katz test.  
1.  Requirement One: Demonstrating an Actual Subjective Expectation of 
Privacy 
Since the Katz opinion, the Court has done little to distinguish 
between the two parts of the Katz test.144 It is true that, often, the issue is 
not raised, but the Court has stated in dicta that part one of the Katz test 
requires that an individual demonstrate that she has taken affirmative steps 
to ensure privacy from unwarranted surveillance.145 For example, in 
Ciraolo v. California, the defendant was growing marijuana in his back 
yard which was surrounded by fences blocking view from the public road, 
but still capable of being seen from an aerial viewpoint.146 Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the Court, stated in dicta that part one of the Katz test in 
this case likely would have required a showing that a defendant has taken 
all affirmative steps to ensure against all conceivable efforts of scrutiny by 
 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 348–49. 
141. Id. at 353. 
142. Id. at 361; see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 579 (noting how Justice 
Harlan’s concurring two-fold test quickly became relied upon by lower courts in 
addressing Fourth Amendment cases). 
143. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
144. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 584 (citing Eric Dean Bender, The Fourth 
Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 744–45 (1986)). 
145. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
146. Id. at 209–10. 
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the government.147 The implication of this comment is that if the issue is 
raised, a defendant will likely need to demonstrate that she has taken steps 
to ensure against all conceivable efforts of scrutiny by the government.148 
Therefore, it is likely appropriate to ponder hypothetical occurrences to 
determine if a defendant has taken steps to protect her privacy and thus 
sufficiently pass the first hurdle of the Katz test.149 
2.  Requirement Two: An Expectation That Society is Prepared to 
Recognize as Reasonable  
The second factor of the Katz test, as mentioned above, requires the 
Court to find that a person’s subjective expectation of privacy be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”150 In other words, the 
second prong of the Katz test asks whether the expectations of privacy are 
constitutionally “justifiable.”151 What is “justifiable” turns on the context of 
the intrusion.152 Justice Harlan further described the second prong by 
writing in his dissent in United States v. White that “[t]he question must be 
answered by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely 
extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against 
the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”153 Being faced 
with varying factual situations and differing technological uses by the 
government has required the Court to look for the answer to the second 
prong by analyzing the structure of society, the patterns of interaction, and 
the web of norms and values.154 As the Court noted in Oliver v. United 
States, the inquiry is based on a “societal understanding” of what “deserves 
protection from government invasion.”155 
The Court, in applying the second prong, does not stop with 
societal expectations, but also makes a judgement with respect to whether 
the investigative practice in question threatens a “sense of security.”156 This 
 
147. Id. at 211–12. It should be clarified that on appeal, the State did not argue 
to the Court that Ciraolo had failed to demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy; however, Chief Justice Burger reasoned there was a question as to whether 
Ciraolo demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy from all observations of 
his backyard.  
148. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 585. 
149. Id. 
150. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
151. Id. at 353. 
152. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 586. 
153. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
154. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 587 (quoting Arnold Simmel, Privacy Is 
Not an Isolated Freedom, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, at 71, 84 (J. Pennock & J. 
Chapman eds. 1971)). 
155. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
156. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 589. 
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inquiry requires viewing the case at hand from a broad perspective, which 
ultimately asks whether permitting the police regularly to engage in the 
specific type of practice requires citizens of the United States to give up 
“too much freedom as the cost of privacy.”157 Moreover, the question 
becomes one that asks if the encroachment on privacy would be intolerable 
because it would impede too much upon the sense of security of persons 
who wished to maintain that security.158 Since Katz was written, the Court 
has further expanded the Katz test and has adopted more nuanced Fourth 
Amendment doctrines159  under the Katz test as it relates to privacy 
protections. Of importance to this note is a discussion on Fourth 
Amendment implications through a state actor’s ongoing surveillance of an 
individual’s relationships and movements. These concerns are addressed 
next.  
3.  Ongoing Surveillance in the Context of the Katz Test  
Depending on the type of investigation, law enforcement will 
sometimes engage in ongoing surveillance of movements and relationships 
in public.160 Generally, fixed surveillance may be used for a period of time 
in an effort to uncover evidence of criminal activity.161 Moving surveillance 
may be conducted briefly or for a period of several months in order to 
determine if an individual has engaged in criminal activity.162 
Use of publicly available information about the individual has 
historically been seen as not violating a Fourth Amendment right,163 and 
thus does not constitute a search or seizure, because “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”164 As earlier Fourth Amendment cases often noted, surveillance 
 
157. Id. (quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth 
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974)). 
158. Id.; see also Amsterdam, supra note 157, at 402 (1974) (“[T]his approach 
raises the question of how tightly the fourth amendment permits people to be 
driven back into the recesses of their lives by the risk of surveillance.”). 
159. There are many other Fourth Amendment doctrines that are vastly 
important but are outside the scope of this note. Among other various Fourth 
Amendment doctrines that will not be mentioned in this note include: the “open 
fields” doctrine; the “container” doctrine; and the “third-party” doctrine.  
160. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 1015. 
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 1016 (citing George C. Christie, Government Surveillance and 
Individual Freedom: A Proposed Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the 
Broader Problem of Government Surveillance of the Individual, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
871, 885 n.68 (1972)). 
164. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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of public movements is not protected because there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy165 in such movements.166  
However, the Court has found issue with use of investigative 
technology that is used to gather and compile information on an individual 
over a large span of time. The Court first noted, in dicta, in United States v. 
Knotts that continual surveillance by the government could constitute a 
search.167 In Knotts, the government placed a “beeper” in a container of 
chloroform purchased by a trio of co-defendants including Knotts.168 From 
the initial purchase, the government followed the “beeper” in the 
chloroform container to an out-of-state, secluded cabin, which upon search 
revealed a large drug operation.169 Before the Court, Knotts argued that the 
surveillance of the beeper’s whereabouts on public roads constituted a 
search, the search was unreasonable, and thus the search violated his Fourth 
Amendment protections.170 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
disagreed with Knotts and held that no search had occurred, and thus there 
was no violation of Knotts’s Fourth Amendment protections.171  
Although the Knotts Court determined there was no search under 
the Fourth Amendment because the beeper tracking that occurred took 
place over public thoroughfares, the majority still discussed that there 
would potentially be a Fourth Amendment issue had the government 
constantly surveyed Knotts’s public movements over the course of twenty-
four hours.172 Disposition of this issue would be left for another day. 
Concerns over constant surveillance were readdressed in United 
States v. Jones.173 In Jones, the Court addressed privacy implications of the 
attachment of a GPS monitoring device to a vehicle driven by Jones over 
the course of twenty-eight days.174 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
would apply a separate test from Katz (expanded on below in the next 
section), but five Justices,175 concurring in the judgment, reasoned that the 
continual twenty-eight day surveillance violated the Katz test.176 Justice 
 
165. Supra Section III(A)(2) (discussing reasonable expectation of privacy 
under Katz). 
166. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 511; Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590–91 
(1974). 
167. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983). 
168. Id. at 278. 
169. Id. at 278–79. 
170. Id. at 284. 
171. Id. at 285. 
172. Id. at 283–84. 
173. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
174. Id. at 404. 
175. See id. at 413–31 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment finding a 
violation of Katz. Alito, J., joined by Ginsberg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., 
concurring in the judgment also finding a violation of Katz). 
176. Id. at 404–05 (Scalia, J., applying the trespass-based test and holding 
there was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). 
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Sotomayor, concurring in the judgment, agreed with the majority approach, 
but reasoned that the twenty-eight day surveillance by the government 
additionally violated Katz since “long term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”177 
Even in cases of short-term monitoring, Justice Sotomayor felt that use of 
constant surveillance “will require particular attention.”178 Cases with 
continuous government surveillance implicated privacy concerns because 
GPS monitoring and other newer technologies are capable of obtaining a 
“wealth of detail about . . . familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”179 Left unregulated, Justice Sotomayor recognized that 
the government can store these records and effectively mine the records for 
information for years.180 Moreover, because technologies like GPS 
monitoring are cheap and efficient, they were capable of evading normal 
checks on abusive law enforcement practices.181  
The same concerns of long-term surveillance were readdressed by 
the Court in Carpenter v. United States.182 In Carpenter, the Court held that 
the government’s procurement of cell-site location information (CSLI) that 
showed Carpenter’s cell phone movement and location over the course of 
seven days violated the Katz test.183 The Carpenter case involved a valid 
federal magistrate judge order that required Carpenter’s cell phone carriers 
to produce collectively 152 days’ worth of CSLI from one mobile carrier 
and seven days’ worth from another mobile carrier.184  
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts relied upon the 
distinctions made in Knotts and Jones. Similar to the concerns voiced by 
Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in Jones,185 Chief Justice 
Roberts emphasized how the CSLI records obtained by the government 
provided an “all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.”186 
Similar to the GPS device used in Jones, the CSLI records were time 
stamped data that provided an “intimate window into a person’s life.”187 
Such location records “hold for many Americans ‘the privacies of life.’”188 
Chief Justice Roberts raised an issue  with the retrospective quality 
of the data obtained in Carpenter as well.189 Because the CSLI records were 
 




181. Id. at 415–16. 
182. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018). 
183. Id. at 2219. 
184. Id. at 2212. 
185. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415. 
186. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
187. Id.  
188. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014)). 
189. Id. at 2218.  
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compiled and maintained over the course of years, the police had all access 
to reconstruct a person’s movements, allowing for the ability to “travel back 
in time” without needing to know in advance which individual they wanted 
to follow.190 What this effectively turned out to be, as Chief Justice Roberts 
explained, is that an individual has been “tailed every moment of every day 
for five years.”191 The Carpenter opinion is one that the Court adopted and 
felt that it must hold in order to “take account of more sophisticated 
systems that are already in use or in development.”192  
As the above discussion reflects, the Katz standard is a test that has 
been highly litigated and has numerous facets to it depending on the context 
and duration of the investigative procedure implemented by government 
authorities. Although seemingly more developed, the Katz test is not the 
only test that the Court has applied in determining whether a government 
action has resulted in a “search” or “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. 
The second test is the Jones test, which is expanded upon in the next 
section.  
B.  The Jones Test 
As briefly discussed above, the Katz test was the sole Fourth 
Amendment “search” test over the past fifty years, but as of 2013, in the 
opinion of United States v. Jones,193 the Court revived a past approach to 
determining whether a government action is a “search” that is based on 
traditional “trespass” law.194 This second test is referred to as the Jones test, 
and like Katz, if the test is satisfied, then the government’s action 
constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
United States v. Jones involved a reexamination of the trespass doctrine–
which prior to the Court’s opinion in Katz was the standard applied by the 
Court in addressing whether a Fourth Amendment “search” or “seizure” has 
occurred.195 Jones involved the government’s installation of a GPS tracking 
device on the undercarriage of a vehicle used by Jones.196 Jones would then 
use this car over the course of the next twenty-eight days where the 




192. Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)). 
193. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012). 
194. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 118, at 593. 
195. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405–06 (Scalia, J., describing how prior to Katz, 
Fourth Amendment protections were tied to common-law trespass). 
196. Id. at 402–03. 
197. Id.  
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Supreme Court Justices would agree that this action constituted a search, 
but not all Justices would agree as to how that holding was reached.198  
The majority did not apply the  Katz test, for a person’s “Fourth 
Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”199 Her 
rights do not rise or fall with Katz because the “Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the 
common-law trespassory test.” Therefore, as the majority reasoned, it was 
enough to show that the “[g]overnment physically occupied private 
property for the purpose of obtaining information [with] such a physical 
intrusion . . . [constituting] a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”200  
Based on the majority’s holding, the Jones test can be broken into 
three factors. First, did the government physically intrude or trespass on 
property?201 Second, was the intrusion by the government into an area 
protected by the Fourth Amendment (persons, houses, papers, effects)?202 
Third, did the government intrude on this protected area to obtain 
information? If these three factors are met, then a “search” has occurred 
under the Jones test.203 
The Jones test was further refined in Florida v. Jardines.204  
Jardines refined the Jones test by adding another element to the mix.  
Based on the holding in Jardines, future application of the Jones test 
requires lower courts to ask whether the officer’s investigation was 
accomplished through an unlicensed physical intrusion.205 Based on the 
Jardines holding, courts now look to see whether the physical intrusion into 
the curtilage of a homeowner’s property extends beyond the implicit license 
that the homeowner allows  potential visitors.206 In Jardines, the Court 
acknowledged that an implicit license is provided to both welcome and 
unwelcome visitors.207 This means that an implicit license will be found to 
extend to friends, relatives, mail carriers, solicitors, peddlers, and others of 
 
198. See id. at 400. All Justices would agree this was a “search” within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor, concurring, believed that 
the majority could have additionally applied Katz and that the government’s actions 
would have constituted a “search” under Katz. Justice Alito, concurring, felt that 
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Katz which would have led to the holding that this was a “search.”  
199. Id. at 406. 
200. Id. at 404–05. 
201. Id. at 404.  
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204. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013). 
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the like.208 This holding comes with its limits. For one, the implicit license 
is spatially limited.209 The Jardines Court noted that the implicit license 
extends to allow visitors to approach a home by the front entrance, as 
opposed to making “circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a 
visitor would customarily use.”210  
The Jardines Court further provided that this rule has its temporal 
limits.211 Ultimately, a visitor has an implicit license to knock promptly, 
wait to be received, and then (absent an invitation to linger longer) 
leave.”212 Thus, an officer’s presence may exceed any implicit license 
merely because of the length of time spent there, such that even plain-view 
situations arising thereafter become unlawful searches.213  
The main distinction between the Katz test and the Jones test is one 
of expectations of privacy versus physical encroachment upon protected 
areas. Under Katz, courts are called to make subjective determinations as to 
whether reasonable expectations of privacy have been violated; a Katz 
“search” can occur regardless of a physical intrusion by government 
officials or government investigative technology. The Jones test, instead, 
focuses on whether the government officials or technology has exceeded 
unlicensed physical intrusions by the government into constitutionally 
protected areas. Whether the government’s use of facial recognition 
technology to obtain and compile biometric data violates the Katz test or 
Jones test is discussed next. 
IV.  FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL USE OF 
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY THAT COMPILES AN 
INDIVIDUAL’S BIOMETRIC DATA 
As discussed earlier, current state law and the proposed federal law, 
the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act of 2019 (“CFRPA”), do 
not regulate the governmental use of facial recognition technology, nor the 
compilation of biometric data on individuals through the use of facial 
recognition technology.214 Based on Fourth Amendment case law, the 
unregulated governmental use of such technology that compiles biometric 
data is an unreasonable “search” and violates the Katz test. Discussion 
below first analyzes the Fourth Amendment implications of compilation of 
biometric data and the Katz test. Following the Katz test discussion is 
analysis on the Jones test implications of biometric data compilation by 
governmental entities.  
 
208. Id. at 8. 
209. See id. at 9. 
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A.  Compilation of Biometric Data Through Governmental Use of 
Facial Recognition Technology is an Unreasonable “Search” Under the 
Katz Test 
Unregulated governmental use of facial recognition technology 
which maintains a database of biometric data violates the Katz test because 
the compilation of biometric data violates all American citizens’ subjective 
expectations of privacy. Recall that Katz requires  a two-fold test be met in 
order for the government action to be considered a search. The two-part test 
for determining whether a search has occurred under Katz requires asking: 
(1) the aggrieved person has demonstrated an actual (subjective) 
expectation of privacy; and (2) the expectation of privacy must “be one that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”215  
First, American citizens demonstrate a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the belief that the government will not constantly survey and 
compile every movement and location. This expectation of privacy extends 
not only to what is done in the home, where privacy protections are at their 
highest,216 but as well to areas out in public, to activities that the person 
seeks to preserve as private.217 Recall in Katz, where the Court held that 
Katz’s expectations of privacy had been violated where he had “justifiably 
relied” on the belief that the contents of his phone call–made at a public pay 
phone–would remain private.218 It is oft quoted that “what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject 
of Fourth Amendment protection,”219 but the Katz Court found a violation 
of expectations of privacy by Katz.220 What was of importance to the Katz 
Court was not the fact that the telephone call occurred in public, but that 
regardless of its public nature, Katz sought to keep the contents of his 
phone call private.221 For “wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know 
that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”222 
These same foundational principles enumerated in Katz have 
consistently been applied by the Court in addressing cases involving the 
government’s use of technology to track movements, obtain, and compile 
information over a course of time. Recall Jones, where Justice Alito, 
concurring in the Court’s judgment, expanded upon how use of longer term 
GPS monitoring (or in this case facial recognition technology) impinges 
 
215. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
216. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (“The overriding respect 
for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the 
origins of the Republic”). 
217. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
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upon expectations of privacy.223 The fact that such GPS monitoring 
violates, as a whole, society’s general expectation that their movements will 
not be tracked and recorded over a period of time turns on the historical 
nature of the ability of law enforcement to investigate crimes.224  
Past law enforcement practices made it to where officers simply 
could not secretly “monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period of time.”225 Prior to the digital age, 
law enforcement may have pursued a suspect for a brief stretch but 
pursuing for a long period of time was difficult, costly and rarely 
undertaken.226 These same concerns were voiced in Carpenter. Even in 
Carpenter, where the petitioner willingly provided his location information 
to the mobile carriers (implicating the third-party doctrine),227 the Court 
held that obtaining the CSLI data displaying Carpenter’s movements over 
days of time contravened his expectations of privacy.228  
Consistent with these opinions, American citizens at the very least 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in keeping their biometric 
identifying information, and derivative locational whereabouts, free from a 
government’s surreptitious compilation of such information.229  
Second, this general expectation of privacy is one that society is 
prepared to recognize as reasonable. A general expectation that the 
government will not catalogue an individual’s biometric identifying 
information, revealing her location at any and all times, is one that is 
“justifiable”230 in light of considering “the impact on the individual’s sense 
of security.”231 Such unregulated use of facial recognition technology and 
compilation of biometric data requires American citizens “to give up too 
much freedom at the cost of privacy.”232 Ultimately, an individual’s 
 
223. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., 
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228. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18. 
229. Id. at 2217 (citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring)). It should 
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biometric data and physical movements is one that “deserves protection 
from government invasion,”233 and past Court precedent bolsters this 
contention. In considering Katz, Jones, and Carpenter, which involved 
smaller invasions of privacy expectations than the issue posed in this case, 
this expectation of privacy is absolutely one that is reasonable.  
Third, government use of facial recognition technology that obtains 
and compiles biometric data is unreasonable absent a valid warrant.234 Since 
the current government use of facial recognition technology is not 
conducted pursuant to a warrant, all unregulated use of this technology is an 
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment pursuant 
to the Katz test.  
B.  Compilation of Biometric Data Through Governmental Use of 
Facial Recognition Technology Likely Does Not Violate the Jones Test 
Depending on the Location of the Technology 
Compilation of biometric data through governmental use of facial 
recognition technology likely does not violate the Jones test. Recall that the 
Jones test requires a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area 
to obtain information.235 With facial recognition technology, there is likely 
no actual physical invasion onto a person’s property and thus, the Jones test 
would not be implicated.  
At least five Justices of the Court would likely agree with this 
proposition. Both Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito, concurring in the 
judgment of Jones, discussed how situations involving the transmission of 
electronic signals would remain subjected to Katz analysis.236 Moreover, as 
Justice Sotomayor notes in Jones, the trespass test offers little guidance in 
cases involving novel modes of surveillance that do not involve a physical 
invasion on a person’s property.237 Based on this reasoning, and until the 
Court provides an extension of the Jones test, it is likely that Jones would 
provide little protection. The Fourth Amendment analysis involving 
electronic surveillance is subjected to a Katz analysis.  
Past Court precedent demonstrates that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements. Governmental use of 
facial recognition technology that compiles biometric data of American 
citizens is an “unreasonable search” within the Fourth Amendment and, 
thus, should be disallowed.   
 
233. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
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V.  FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH: 
STATUTORY REFORM IS NEEDED 
Fourth Amendment rights extend to all American citizens and serve 
as the lowest form of civil liberties granted, irrespective of federal statutory 
law or state law. In other words, neither Congress, state legislatures, nor 
lower courts may abolish any protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment and its interpretative case law. But the Fourth Amendment 
serves as the bottom line: Congress and the states do have the power to 
afford greater protections than what is extended by the United States 
Constitution.  
Do we need more protections though? Are there compelling 
reasons to focus legislative efforts on fashioning comprehensive reform, 
allowing for greater protections against governmental use of facial 
recognition technology? If so, what is the best route?  
To be sure, there are arguments that lean both ways. We can be 
confident in knowing that national security, and the need for it, is always of 
utmost importance. Between terrorism threats, domestic extremism, trade 
conflicts, cyberattacks, and the always lurking issues over nuclear threats, 
facial recognition technology provides a valuable means for keeping a 
watchful eye over subjects thought to pose a threat to America and its 
people.238 Yet, the United States’ democracy is founded upon individual 
rights and basic civil liberties; as discussed in detail above, unregulated 
compilation of a person’s biometric data, which provides an all-
encompassing record into someone’s life, encroaches into protections that 
are the cornerstone of the United States Constitution. Among these basic 
rights includes the right to privacy, a right to be free in one’s self,  free from 
oppressive government, and unrestricted from overreaching investigative 
tactics.239  
Individual liberties weigh strongly in favor of adopting more 
protections in the form of statutory reform to ensure that an individual’s 
right to privacy is protected. This section proceeds by addressing policy 
considerations for adopting greater protections to secure privacy rights. 
After exploring policy concerns, this note shifts gears by proposing 
statutory protections that draw heavily from the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act, otherwise commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act or 
Title III.  
This section will conclude by discussing the strengths in adopting 
statutory protections and explores the advantages of the legislative branch 
 
238. See THIRD WAY, Talking Points for the Top National Security Issues of 
2019 (June 3, 2019), http://thirdway.imgix.net/pdfs/talking-points-for-the-top-
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in fashioning comprehensive statutory protections that ensure privacy, 
while still allowing for lawful use of governmental use of facial recognition 
technology and compilation of biometric data, under appropriate measures 
and standards. The ultimate aim of the statutory proposal is to demonstrate 
the viability of this measure which would ultimately ensure a much-needed 
balance between privacy rights and law enforcement needs for use of facial 
recognition technology in combating crime.  
A.  Why Do We Need Stronger Privacy Protections Than What is 
Afforded by the Fourth Amendment?240 
Fourth Amendment protections are implicated where a state actor 
uses facial recognition technology to compile an individual’s biometric 
data. From a 30,000-foot view, we can all agree that an always watching 
camera that records our every movement is concerning and intrusive. But, 
at the heart of the matter, why do American citizens deserve greater 
protections against unregulated governmental use of facial recognition 
technology? How exactly does this technology, and the derivative use of 
compilation of biometric data, impinge upon our privacy expectations and 
protections? On a fundamental level, privacy touches the essence of our 
personhood. Michael McFarland states that, “[r]everence for the human 
person as an end in itself and as an autonomous being requires respect for 
personal privacy. To lose control of one’s personal information is in some 
measure to lose control of one’s life and one’s dignity.”241  
To be sure, Michael McFarland offers five arguments that lend 
support of adopting more privacy protections. These five arguments will be 
addressed in turn below and include protection: (1) against misuse of 
personal information; (2) of relationships; (3) of autonomy; (4) of human 
dignity; and (5) against boundless government power. 
1.  Protection and the Misuse of Personal Information 
Privacy protections include the need to protect a person against 
revealing her sensitive personal information. Michael McFarland describes 
this sensitive personal information as including medical records, 
psychological tests, court records, financial records, welfare records, 
internet site records, and other sources that “hold many intimate details of a 
 
240. Another component of privacy rights and constitutional protection is the 
First Amendment right to freedom of association. Where this section largely 
touches on First Amendment arguments, the First Amendment right to freedom of 
association is outside the scope of this note. 
241. Michael McFarland, Why We Care About Privacy, SANTA CLARA UNIV. 
(June 1, 2012), https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/internet-ethics/resources/
why-we-care-about-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/B5N4-B3XH]. 
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person’s life.”242 The concern with the government obtaining sensitive 
information is that it is susceptible to abuse in the form of prejudice and 
discrimination.243 McFarland poses a hypothetical to illustrate this point. 
Consider a situation where others become aware that a person has a history 
of mental illness. With this knowledge, he could be harassed and shunned 
by neighbors or employers. Harassment could infiltrate itself into the 
workplace, subjecting a person to insensitive remarks, serious emotional 
distress, embarrassment, and prejudice.  
The hypothetical posed by McFarland is not a far stretch when we 
consider the current state of privacy protections in China. Currently, China 
employs a social credit system to evaluate their citizens.244 The social credit 
system, as Business Insider describes it, is a ranking system that ranks 
every single person based on their “social credit.”245 Projections show that 
the program is to be fully in operation by 2020 and will be mandatory for 
every citizen.246 The exact method that is used to increase or decrease 
someone’s score is unknown, but examples of infractions include 
unacceptable driving habits, smoking in non-smoking zones, buying too 
many video games, and posting fake news online (information that would 
otherwise require obtaining sensitive personal information about payment 
and website search history).247 
The social credit system does not merely stand as a number 
reflecting your value to society: a low social credit number exposes persons 
to varying levels of punishments.248 For one, a low social credit number 
prevents unsatisfactory citizens from flying or traveling by train. It is 
estimated that nine million China citizens are currently unable to fly 
domestically due to their inadequate social credit numbers.249 Others with 
low social credit numbers are either banned from attending higher 
education schools, or worse, their blameless children are banned from these 
programs.250 For example, in 2018, a Chinese university denied an 
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Even where some Chinese citizens are lucky enough to escape the 
consequences of their deficient behavior, in the eyes of the government, 
citizens can still be sure that there is always the option that they will be 
publicly shamed for all to see their wrongdoings.252 Failure to pay a fine or 
court-ordered compensation, or a default on your debts, will place the 
substandard citizen on the “list of untrustworthy persons.”253 When these 
“blacklisted” persons cross certain intersections in Beijing, facial 
recognition technology projects their face and ID number on massive 
electronic billboards.254 China describes this social credit system as an idea 
that “keeping trust is glorious and breaking trust is disgraceful.”255   
Sure, the Chinese “social credit system” is by all means an extreme 
example, but the underlying point is this: the social credit system thrives on 
the government having an individual’s personal information. In other 
words, the social credit system would not be viable without the millions of 
cameras capturing your substandard driving, one too many cigarettes 
smoked, or disagreeable eating habits or website viewing habits. If 
anything, the Chinese social credit system demonstrates the undeniable 
power of information and the need to preserve privacy protections.  
2.  Privacy and Relationships 
Privacy protections are vital to facilitate social interchange and 
relationships.256 James Rachels, in Why Privacy is Important,257 argues that 
privacy is an essential prerequisite for forming relationships.258 The 
strength of the relationship turns on the degree of intimacy between the two 
persons and the information each are willing to reveal.259 What personal 
information is revealed to either a friend or significant other is much 
different than what one would reveal to an employer or a government 
entity.260 
As Rachels points out, relationships of all kinds, be it a close friend 
or an acquaintance, require a special level of openness and trust that is only 
possible with assurances that what one reveals will be able to be kept 
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private.261 Consider, for example, two distinct relationships: the husband-
wife and the therapist-client relationships. Both of these relationships serve 
much needed goals in society, but both can easily crumble once these 
persons lose assurance that their revelations will either be disclosed or are 
capable of being discovered by a third party.262 Moreover, if we place 
relationships under constant observation, then persons could not enjoy the 
degree of intimacy that has been afforded to their relationships over the 
course of life.263 Charles Fried states the issue more broadly. Fried writes 
that privacy is “necessarily related to the ends and relations of the most 
fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust . . . without privacy 
they are simply inconceivable.”264  
3.  Privacy and Autonomy 
 McFarland suggests that the analysis from Rachels and Fried 
reflect a more fundamental issue underlying privacy rights, that is, personal 
freedom.265 Deborah Johnson put it as “[t]o recognize an individual as an 
autonomous being, an end in himself, entails letting that individual live his 
life as he chooses. Of course, there are limits to this, but one of the critical 
ways that an individual controls his life is by choosing with whom he will 
have relationships and what kind of relationships these will be . . . 
information mediates relationships. Thus, when one cannot control who has 
information about one, one loses considerable autonomy.”266 
McFarland argues that “los[ing] control of personal information is 
to lose control of who we are and who we can be in relation to the rest of 
society.”267 As he writes, “[a] normal person’s social life is rich and varied, 
encompassing many different roles and relationships. Each requires a 
different persona, a different face. This does not necessarily entail 
deception, only that different aspects of the person are revealed in different 
roles.”268 Once this personal information becomes controlled over how and 
to whom it is revealed, an individual loses control over his ability to choose 
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4.  Privacy and Human Dignity 
Autonomy is a smaller characteristic of the broader right to basic 
human dignity.270 McFarland suggests that there is an obligation on part of 
the government and others to treat people not merely as means and data, but 
as valuable and worthy of respect in themselves.271 Personal information, 
ultimately, is an extension of the person, including and encompassing all 
intimate details of their life.272 Once others access the intimate and detailed 
information, they have in essence accessed the person.273 McFarland argues 
that where “personal information is taken, sold, or distributed, against the 
person’s will, . . . [his individuality] . . . becomes alienated” and transitions 
into value as merely a commodity.274 Essentially, obtaining one’s personal 
information or data treats the person more as an item, and a means to be 
used for some other end.275 
5.  Privacy and Safeguarding of Freedom Against Boundless Power 
Knowledge of an individual’s personal information is powerful. 
Individual privacy is an absolute necessity in order to safeguard the 
freedom of relationships between individuals, groups, and the government. 
Alan Westin, in discussing privacy rights, draws attention to the fact that 
surveillance and publicity are extremely powerful instruments of social 
control.276 Once an “individual’s actions and dispositions” become 
publicized, constantly observed, and subjected to comment or criticism, 
individual expression and association with others becomes suppressed. For 
where actions are under constant scrutiny, an individual will find it 
challenging, at best, and fearful, at worst, to stay from social norms and 
stay true to her individual qualities, characteristics, and beliefs.277 
Viewed under inspection, the ability to stand alone, to be different, 
to be individual, becomes frightening, especially where these valuable 
individual qualities are subject to public criticism.278 Westin states that the 
“deliberate penetration of the individual’s protective shell, his 
psychological armor, would leave him naked to ridicule and shame and 
would put him under the control of those who know his secrets.”279 It is 
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suggested, or required, social norms as opposed to stand apart in their true 
beliefs and expressions.280 
What this means for privacy is that protections from the excessive 
scrutiny of an overreaching government power are required and are 
necessary for individuals to “be free to be themselves.”281 The ability of one 
to develop her unique individuality is especially important in the United 
States democracy, “which values and depends on creativity, 
nonconformism and the free interchange of diverse ideas.”282 This is what 
our democracy is founded upon.283 As Westin writes, “[j]ust as a social 
balance favoring disclosure and surveillance over privacy is a functional 
necessity for totalitarian systems, so a balance that ensures strong citadels 
of individual and group privacy and limits both disclosure and surveillance 
is a prerequisite for liberal democratic societies. The democratic society 
relied on publicity as a control over government, and on privacy as a shield 
for group and individual life.”284  
To be sure, we need not look far back in the threads of history to 
find totalitarian governments using sophisticated methods of surveillance as 
a means of controlling their citizens. Reconsider the Soviet Union, 
Communist China, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and parts of South Africa 
that all used overt observation techniques, “interrogation, eavesdropping . . 
. and other means of data collection to convince their [citizens] that their 
independent or ‘antisocial’ thought, speech, and behavior was 
unacceptable” in modern day society.285 Often, the threat and 
implementation of continuous surveillance alone was enough to “keep 
people in line,” but where it was not, the data collected through use of 
technology was then used to identify and publish dissenters of social norms 
that the governments deemed dangerous.286 
Ignazio Silone wrote about the surveillance conditions in the 
Fascist Italy society in his book Bread and Wine.287 Silone writes, “[i]t is 
well-known . . . that the police have their informers in every section of 
every big factory, in every bank, in every big office . . . . This state of 
affairs spreads suspicion and distrust throughout all classes of population. 
On this degradation of man into a frightened animal, who quivers with fear 
and hates his neighbor in his fear, and watches him, betrays him, sells him, 
and then lives in fear of discovery . . . . The real organization on which the 
system in this country is based is the secret manipulation of fear.”288 
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Governments today still use surveillance as an “instrument of 
oppression.”289 In 1996, Phillip Zimmerman, author of PGP (Pretty Good 
Privacy), wrote about a letter he once received from a human rights activist 
in Yugoslavia.290 Zimmerman relays the message by writing, “[o]ur various 
offices have been raided by various police forces looking for evidence of 
spying or subversive activities. Our mail has been regularly tampered with 
and out office in Romania has a constant wiretap. Last year . . . the security 
police raided our office and confiscated our computers in hopes of 
retrieving information about the identities of people who complained . . . 
.”291 More recently, dissenters on social media and on other Internet sources 
commenced the “Arab Spring” uprising, a series of government protests 
that opposed oppressive government regimes and substandard living 
conditions, which led Egypt and Libya to shut down the internet in an 
attempt to stifle dissent.292 Again, as discussed earlier, China and its 
extreme monitoring has met constant backlash from activist groups due to 
their censorship of the Internet.293  
These same tactics hit home when we analyze the tactics used by 
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) and other high ranking offices and 
officials.294 From 1952–1974, the NSA and armed forces “kept files on 
about 75,000 Americans, including civil rights and antiwar activists, and 
even members of Congress.”295 In the early 1970’s, the Nixon 
Administration broke into the office of the psychiatrist for Daniel Ellsberg, 
who was suspected of leaking the Pentagon Papers,296 and stole the 
psychiatrist’s records.297 Fast forward to the 1996 presidential campaign, 
which “revealed that the Clinton White House had access to the FBI 
investigative records of 300 Republications who had served in the Reagan 
and Bush administrations.”298 What was claimed to be a mistake by the 
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Clinton administration was termed by the FBI as an “egregious violation of 
privacy.”299  
More recently, government surveillance increased after the 9/11 
terrorist attack, fueling increased power for the NSA.300 Wired magazine 
described the power of the NSA as, “[e]stablish[ing] listening posts 
throughout the nation to collect and sift through billions of email messages 
and phone calls, whether they originate within the country or overseas. It 
has created a supercomputer of almost unimaginable speed to look for 
patterns and unscramble codes. Finally, the agency has begun building a 
place to store all the trillions of words and thoughts and whispers captured 
in its electronic net.”301  
Privacy is not absolute, and it should not be. Governments do need 
information, including personal information in order to govern effectively 
and to protect the security of American citizens; however, American 
citizens expect and deserve protection from “overzealous and malicious 
use” of our personal information, especially by governments that have 
enormous power.302 Privacy values, rights, and expectations deserve 
protection against unregulated governmental use of facial recognition 
technology that compiles an individual’s biometric data. To ensure a proper 
balance, a comprehensive statutory act could provide privacy protections, 
securing an individual’s dignity, personal freedom, and individual qualities, 
while still properly allowing for compilation of biometric data under 
appropriate measures and circumstances.  
B.  Proposed Statutory Act Based on The Wiretap Act 
A proposed statutory act that draws heavily from key provisions of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (the “Wiretap 
Act”)303 would maintain the ultimate balancing of ensuring individual 
privacy protections while equally equipping government authorities of all 
levels with the regulated and controlled use of facial recognition 
technology. This subsection sets forth in detail below key provisions that 
the proposed statutory act would take from the Wiretap Act.  
There are seven key provisions in particular that the proposed 
statutory act would implement from the Wiretap Act.304 Among these 
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provisions is, first, a general prohibition against unregulated use of facial 
recognition technology that compiles biometric data. Second is a provision 
allowing for a search warrant based on the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause standard to allow compilation of biometric data on a certain 
individual for a specific period of time. Third are restrictions on the 
application process by allowing only investigators and prosecutors to apply 
for the search warrant. Fourth is a provision limiting the ordering of the 
search warrant to be executed by a federal district judge, or a state judge of 
the same level, and the requisite high standard of proof that must be met 
prior to granting the search warrant. Fifth is a provision describing the 
process for executing the search warrant and additionally keeping the judge 
apprised of how the investigative efforts are proceeding. Sixth is a 
provision allowing for both criminal and civil penalties against violators of 
the proposed Act. Seventh, any and all evidence obtained by the result of 
unlawful compilation of biometric data through use of facial recognition 
technology is inadmissible in court and thus capable of being suppressed by 
the aggrieved party. Each provision is addressed in chronological order 
below.  
1.  General Prohibition Against Compilation of Biometric Data Through 
the Use of Facial Recognition Technology 
The touchstone of the proposed statutory reform is a general 
prohibition against the collection and maintenance of a comprehensive 
database containing an individual’s biometric data obtained through use of 
facial recognition technology. This provision draws heavily from the 
Wiretap Act which provides, in general, that government interception of 
wire, oral, or electronic communications by private persons, absent consent, 
is forbidden and unlawful.305 Like the Wiretap Act, this proposed statutory 
act provides that absent valid consent, any evidence obtained of criminal 
activity is improper and unlawful,306 unless a valid search warrant was 
obtained prior to using the investigative technology. The search warrant 
process and requirements are discussed next. 
2.  Exception to the General Prohibition: A Search Warrant Based on 
Probable Cause 
Under this proposed statutory act, any government authority may 
lawfully compile biometric data through the use of facial recognition 
technology so long as a valid search warrant is obtained prior to using such 
technology. Like the Wiretap Act, this reform calls for a search warrant that 
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complies with standard Fourth Amendment requirements.307 The probable 
cause standard under the Wiretap Act requires that the judge make a finding 
of probable cause that shows “an individual is committing, has committed, 
or is about to commit a particular offense.”308 The probable cause standard, 
like the Fourth Amendment standard, requires that the information be 
specific and particularly describe the place(s) to be searched and the 
person(s) or thing(s) to be seized.309  
Along the same lines, the information provided must establish 
probable cause that compilation of the data will produce images from the 
facial recognition technology that concerns the particular suspected offense 
and will be produced from cameras located in specific targeted facilities or 
premises.310 By requiring a strict probable cause standard that is sufficiently 
specific and detailed, legislatures would ensure that law enforcement efforts 
are tailored to reduce overly broad search efforts and, additionally, are 
based on reliable and accurate sources of information.  
3.  The Search Warrant Application Process 
In order to curb any potential violations by investigative officials, 
the proposed statutory reform, like the Wiretap Act, would impose extra 
constitutional requirements within the search warrant application process. 
More specifically, the application process would limit potential applicants 
to federal (or state) investigators and prosecutors that are specifically 
authorized to apply for a warrant.311 Where investigators or prosecutors are 
authorized to apply for a search warrant, the application will be limited to 
specific crimes.312 Trivial crimes such as minor offenses or misdemeanors 
would be outside the purview of the search warrant application and thus 
could not be applied for.  
To address concerns of prosecutors or investigators who take 
advantage of the search warrant application process (applying very often), 
this Act, like the Wiretap Act, would require applicants to inform the judge 
of all known past applications that involve the same persons, facilities, or 
places.313 Additionally, past denied or granted applications would have to 
be reported to the judge.314  
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Perhaps of greatest importance, the proposed statutory reform 
would require that an application for the search warrant only be made when 
prior “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or 
reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be dangerous.”315 
Before the judge will grant the search warrant, she must be satisfied that all 
requirements have been met and that issuing the search warrant is an 
investigative measure being taken as a last resort. 
4.  Limitations on Who May Issue the Order Granting the Search Warrant 
Conventional search warrants provide for the issuance of a search 
warrant by a neutral and detached magistrate.316 The Wiretap Act calls for 
higher protections.317 The proposed statute would only allow a federal 
district court judge, circuit court judge, or state court judges of similar 
status to issue a valid search warrant.318 In reviewing the applications for 
the search warrant, the judge must be satisfied that all application 
requirements are met. Even where these requirements are met, the judge, in 
her official capacity, may still decide to deny the application.319 
Where the judge does decide to grant the search warrant, she is 
further empowered with numerous other controls in order to maintain the 
limited scope of the investigative search. Among these controls includes the 
requirement that investigators or prosecutors submit to the court periodic 
reports that discloses the progress that has been made towards the goal of 
the investigation.320 
Moreover, the granted search warrant, like traditional search 
warrants executed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, must be limited in 
duration of time throughout the day.321  
5.  Guidelines for Conducting the Search 
Once the judge has issued a valid search warrant, the proposed 
statutory reform requires the investigative officers to use the technology in 
such a manner that minimizes the interception of captured and stored 
images that are not the subject of the search warrant.322 Once the officers 
have achieved their “authorized objective,” all investigative efforts must be 
 
315. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3)(c). 
316. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971). 
317. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, § 1:10 Title III, in 
WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2019). 
318. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(9)(a). 
319. See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 317. 
320. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(6). 
321. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2518(1)(d), 4(e). 
322. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5). 
640 BELMONT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8: 600 
stopped.323 Where investigative efforts are unsuccessful and do not produce 
evidence of the suspected crime within the specific timeline allowed by the 
search warrant, then all efforts must seize.324 Conduct effectuated by the 
search is solely limited to use of facial recognition technology, and thus no 
other investigative efforts may be used pursuant to the search warrant. Once 
incriminating images are captured, all images must be turned over to the 
judge who issued the search warrant.325  
6.  Penalties for Violations of the Proposed Statutory Reform 
Similar to the Wiretap Act, violators of the proposed statutory 
reform would be liable for both criminal326 and civil sanctions.327 Any 
aggrieved parties may bring a civil cause of action if their biometric data is 
wrongfully captured, disclosed, or used by government officials.328  
7.  Suppressing Unlawfully Obtained Evidence 
Similar to the Wiretap Act, the proposed statutory reform would 
allow for any aggrieved person to move to suppress any unlawfully 
obtained evidence and thus would render such evidence inadmissible in 
court.329 Unlawfully obtained evidence may be suppressed where: (1) the 
biometric data was unlawfully obtained; (2) the order granting the search 
warrant was insufficient on its face; or (3) the acts that led to the discovery 
of information from the use of the facial recognition technology did not 
comply with the scope of the valid search warrant.330 The motion to 
suppress may be made at trial, hearings, or proceedings within any court 
that has jurisdiction.331  
The aforementioned seven touchstone provisions of the proposed 
act ultimately seek to implement a comprehensive act that provides law 
enforcement and the courts with the ability to apply clear standards. The 
objective of the proposed statutory act is to maintain a much-needed 
balance between individual privacy protections while still allowing law 
enforcement access to the valuable tool of facial recognition technology. 
Subsection (C), discussed next, explores the strengths and viability 
of a legislative measure based in large part on the Wiretap Act, while 
addressing relevant counterarguments.  
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C.  A Proposed Statutory Act Based on the Wiretap Act Is An Effective 
Measure to Protect Privacy Interests  
The proposed statutory act is an effective measure to protect 
privacy rights, while also permitting governmental use of facial recognition 
technology that compiles an individual’s biometric data, because the 
proposed act creates comprehensive guidelines and standards. The 
suggested provisions in the proposed act provide both judges and law 
enforcement with clear criteria and requirements in obtaining a warrant that 
would allow the compilation of an individual’s biometric data, under the 
appropriate circumstances. To be sure, the history of the Wiretap Act 
demonstrates that its efforts have largely been successful, on the whole, in 
providing guidelines for judges and law enforcement in granting access to 
wiretap a suspect’s telephone line. Concerns of clarity and uniformity in 
application of wiretapping laws are further bolstered by the fact that courts 
repeatedly defer to the Wiretap Act, even where there are gaps in the 
legislation. Legislatures, additionally, have institutional advantages in 
creating comprehensive statutory laws to address sophisticated technology. 
These arguments will be addressed in turn. 
1.  History Demonstrates that the Wiretap Act is Effective   
The practice of wiretapping became commonplace soon after the 
arrival of the telegraph in 1837 and the invention of the telephone in 
1876.332 Issues soon began to arise when business competitors endeavored 
to surreptitiously spy in on private conversations for private gain.333 
Catching onto this practice, legislatures began to pass statutes prohibiting 
wiretapping.334 California passed the first statute in 1862, and by 1928, 
more than half of the states had fashioned varying laws outlawing the 
private practice of wiretapping.335  
Prior to 1919 and the National Prohibition Act, courts had yet to 
consider whether law enforcement use of wiretapping violated Fourth 
Amendment protections.336 Soon after the passing of the National 
Prohibition Act, the number of federal criminal cases greatly increased, and 
the number of executed search warrants exponentially increased.337 Due to 
the increase in the unlawful production and transportation of alcohol, the 
use of wiretapping began to increase throughout the United States. By 
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1928, the issue of whether the investigative practice violated Fourth 
Amendment protections reached the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United 
States.338 In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court in a 5–4 
decision, held that the practice of wiretapping did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment because the government did not physically trespass onto 
Olmstead’s property;339 however, Chief Justice Taft invited Congress to 
pass statutory protections, allowing for the exclusion of evidence obtained 
from wiretapping.340  
Six years after the Olmstead opinion, Congress followed through 
with Chief Justice Taft’s suggestion and passed the Communications Act of 
1934,341 which prohibited the disclosure of evidence obtained from 
wiretapping.342 The Communications Act clearly made wiretapping a 
criminal offense, but the specific remedy provided for by the Act remained 
unclear.343 Three years after the passing of the Communications Act, the 
Supreme Court, in Nardone v. United States, upheld the validity of the 
Communications Act and determined that the Act’s remedy served as an 
evidentiary function, rendering all wiretapping evidence inadmissible in 
federal courts.344 The importance of Nardone was not necessarily the 
opinion itself but instead the Court’s willingness to accept Congress’s role 
in the privacy sphere, by deferring the Court’s judgments to the more 
defined statutory law crafted by Congress, and the Court clarifying gaps in 
the statutes, such as in Nardone, when need be.345 Notably, in effect, the 
Communications Act outlawed the practice of wiretapping, inherently 
overruling the Olmstead holding, and the Court raised no issue with this.346  
Over the course of the next thirty years, wiretapping laws would 
remain largely unchanged.347 At this time, thirty-six states have banned 
wiretapping, but of the thirty-six, twenty-seven states still allow the 
interception of communications through wiretapping under appropriate 
circumstances.348 At the time, the most prominent state wiretapping law 
was New York’s statute, which prohibited wiretapping unless pursuant to a 
valid search warrant.349 The constitutionality of the New York statute was 
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addressed in 1967 in the case of Berger v. New York.350 Berger proved to be 
an opinion of great significance because the Court’s opinion would lay 
down requirements for future wiretapping laws, consistent with Fourth 
Amendment principles.351 The Berger requirements include (1) that “a 
neutral and detached authority” evaluate whether probable cause exists 
before wiretapping occurs; (2) that the application for the court order to 
explain “[w]hat specific crime has been or is being committed,” “the place 
to be searched,” and “the persons or things to be seized”; (3) that the order 
authorizing the wiretapping “places a termination date” on the surveillance; 
(4) that there is “notice as [with] conventional warrants,” or “some showing 
of special facts” to excuse notice; and (5) “a return on the warrant.”352 Since 
the New York statute did not have many of the requirements, the Berger 
Court held the statute was unconstitutional.353 
Professor Kerr discusses how Berger was abnormal in the sense 
that the Court reviewed the statute on a facial challenge, as opposed to an as 
applied challenge to Berger.354 Kerr suggests that this unusual facial 
challenge in Berger was not mere happenstance but the Court’s awareness 
of Congress’s interest in revising the federal wiretapping laws that had 
proved to be insufficient.355 This contention is further bolstered by Justice 
White’s dissent in Berger, where Justice White noted that Congress, at this 
point in time, was patiently awaiting the Court’s decision to see how the 
Court would rule, to determine what the Berger opinion meant for future 
wiretapping laws and the requisite provisions needed to comply with Fourth 
Amendment protections.356 A plausible suggestion and extension is that the 
Court recognized, at this time, Congress was best fit to develop a 
comprehensive plan that would provide guidance to judges and law 
enforcement. This suggestion is supported by Justice Black’s dissent in the 
Katz v. United States opinion.357 Justice Black, dissenting, discussed the 
majority’s efforts to “guide States in the enactment and enforcement of 
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laws passed to regulate wiretapping by government [in accord with the 
Fourth Amendment].”358 The Berger and Katz decisions demonstrate that 
the Court carefully rendered its opinion in a carefully timed manner to 
influence the statutory law that was soon to come.359 
Two weeks after the Berger opinion, Congress proposed the 
Electronic Surveillance Control Act.360 Soon thereafter, two more proposals 
were made to comply with the Katz opinion.361 In 1968, Congress would 
pass the Wiretap Act, based on Berger and Katz.362 The Wiretap Act has 
been governing law on government use of wiretap since its 
implementation.363  
Turning to modern wiretapping law, post Berger, Katz, and the 
Wiretap Act, statutory law remains the guiding force in deciding 
wiretapping cases.364 Over the course of the past fifty years, Fourth 
Amendment decisions regulating wiretapping remain rare.365 As Professor 
Kerr notes, when courts are confronted with claims that wiretapping 
violated the Fourth Amendment, courts have deferred back to the Wiretap 
Act, and its formidable privacy protections, instead of conducting a separate 
Fourth Amendment analysis or even addressing the law on facial 
grounds.366  
To be sure, the Wiretap Act remains the guiding force in deciding 
wiretapping cases, but the comprehensive Act has its gaps, holes, and 
weaknesses.367 In fact, there are many forms of new technologies, like video 
surveillance, GPS monitoring, and satellite technology that Congress has 
wholly left unregulated.368 But what remains compelling about the Wiretap 
Act is that, with even areas of weakness, courts remain reluctant to find 
these holes in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and instead, the courts 
have continued to defer to Congress and the protections it has afforded.369 
For example, the Sixth Circuit, in McKamey v. Roach,370 considered the 
constitutionality of the practice of wiretapping of cordless phone calls, 
which was specifically exempted by the Wiretap Act. Yet even in 
McKamey, the Sixth Circuit refused to rule that the Fourth Amendment 
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provided protection from warrantless wiretapping of cordless phone calls, 
otherwise decisively left unprotected by the Wiretap Act, and instead, the 
Sixth Circuit deferred to Congress, and the protections afforded by the 
Wiretap Act.371 The same year McKamey was decided, the Fourth Circuit, 
in United States v. McNulty, a case also involving warrantless wiretapping 
of cordless phone calls, stated: 
In the fast-developing area of communications technology, 
courts should be cautious not to wield the amorphous 
“reasonable expectation of privacy” standard, in a manner 
that nullifies the balance between privacy rights and law 
enforcement needs struck by Congress in Title III . . . . As 
new technologies continue to appear . . . the primary job of 
evaluating their impact on privacy rights and of updating 
the law must remain with the branch of government 
designed to make such policy choices, the legislature.372  
Litigants have further challenged the Wiretap Act, and its gaps, when 
arguing for potential civil claims under the Fourth Amendment for illegal 
wiretapping.373 The Sixth Circuit, in Adams v. Battle Creek, deferred to the 
Wiretap Act, holding that the only appropriate remedy for illegal 
wiretapping practices are statutory claims that are provided under the 
Wiretap Act.374 In other words, the Adams court deferred to the Wiretap Act 
protections and refused to further extend Fourth Amendment protections by 
otherwise allowing for civil remedies under the Constitution.375 The Adams 
court reached this holding because the Wiretap Act “seeks to balance 
privacy rights and law enforcement needs, keeping in mind the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search and seizure.”376  
Deference has further been conferred to Congress and Title III in 
cases involving covert video surveillance, which is specifically exempted 
from the Wiretap Act.377 In reviewing this gap in the Wiretap Act, courts 
have held that Fourth Amendment protections are satisfied so long as the 
government complies with equivalent statutory standards set forth in the 
Wiretap Act which regulate audio wiretapping.378 In other areas that 
Congress’s Wiretap Act has left unregulated, courts, rather than crafting 
new constitutional law rules, defer to adopting the nearest statutory 
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requirements.379 Remarkably, in national security cases involving 
wiretapping, the Supreme Court even went as far as calling on Congress to 
enact new standards to address national security contexts under the Wiretap 
Act, rather than taking its own measures to craft new Fourth Amendment 
case law to address these issues.380 
The above efforts are made to demonstrate three points: (1) the 
proposed statutory act, based on the Wiretap Act, is likely constitutional; 
(2) courts, in areas of sophisticated technology, defer to Congress; and (3) 
continued deference by courts, over the course of the past fifty years, allows 
for clarity and uniformity in application.  
To be certain that the proposed act is likely constitutional, recall 
from the discussion above, the Wiretap Act was fashioned and 
manufactured based off of the requirements laid down by the Court in 
Berger and Katz. These efforts, reliant upon Berger and Katz, were taken 
by Congress to ensure further wiretap statutes would comply with Fourth 
Amendment protections. Once the Wiretap Act was drafted and enacted, it 
has survived numerous facial challenges over the course of fifty years and 
remains standing as the controlling wiretap statute. What does this mean for 
a proposed act regulating facial recognition technology, that is based on the 
Wiretap Act? We can be sure that the key provisions in the proposed act 
would likely be held to be constitutional, in accord with Fourth Amendment 
protections since these key provisions have repeatedly been held to be 
constitutional.  
Based on the history of the Wiretap Act, a proposed act regulating 
governmental use of facial recognition technology would likely be deferred 
to by the judicial branch, even if there were gaps and holes in the proposed 
act. To be sure, the Wiretap Act, like any other statute, does have its 
weaknesses. However, these same gaps and holes may either be 
inapplicable to the proposed act or could otherwise be remedied upon 
drafting and enactment of the proposed act. In other words, this is the 
perfect opportunity for Congress to learn from past mistakes in 
implementing reform to regulate governmental use of facial recognition 
technology.  
Opposers to statutory protections may doubt the ability of Congress 
to draft a comprehensive act that provides detailed guidance for every 
single situation. Yet, even if a proposed act were to result in gaps, the 
history of the Wiretap Act demonstrates that a proposed act would be 
deferred to by the various court systems. This deference ultimately provides 
for clarity and uniformity of law; law enforcement agencies and judges can 
be sure that law enforcement actions comply with both Fourth Amendment 
protections, and statutory protections, when the statutory act is complied 
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with. Stated another way, so long as law enforcement complies with the 
detailed mandates of the proposed act, the actions are constitutional. If the 
proposed act does result in gaps in protection, courts will likely still defer to 
the proposed act, which provides the opportunity for Congress to amend a 
small portion of the proposed statutory act, otherwise not resulting in large 
change in application of the law.  
Furthermore, Legislatures have institutional advantages to craft 
effective comprehensive statutory acts to balance privacy rights and 
government needs. This argument is addressed next. 
2.  Legislatures Have Institutional Advantages to Create Effective 
Comprehensive Statutory Law that Balances Privacy Rights and 
Government Needs   
Legislatures have distinct institutional advantages that provide for 
the ability to draft and implement detailed comprehensive statutory 
reform.381 Because of these advantages, legislatures are capable of creating 
rules that address quickly changing and complex technologies. Among 
these advantages include (1) the ability to create rules ex ante (for the 
future); (2) flexibility in drafting and amending laws; and (3) the power to 
draft rules tailored to a wide range of inputs from competing views.382 Each 
advantage will be addressed more in depth below.   
a.  Crafting Rules for the Future  
First, Congress and state legislatures have the distinct power to 
draft laws ex ante, or for the future.383 With this advantage, legislatures are 
capable of acting at any time, even when technology is new.384 This allows 
for legislatures to combat newly changing technologies by acting early in 
the development or implementation of the technology.385 History 
corroborates this point. Consider the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act which regulates the privacy of emails.386 This Act was implemented in 
1986, before most Americans used the technology for commercial or 
personal uses.387  
To appreciate this advantage, the court system and its 
disadvantages must be considered. Courts, as opposed to legislatures, 
cannot enact comprehensive rules of law in an expedited manner.388 Instead, 
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courts must first wait for the appropriate case to make its way into the court 
system.389 Before the appropriate case can come to fruition, the specific 
technology at issue must first be used by government officers in the course 
of investigating a criminal offense.390 Such technology must then produce 
evidence of a crime, and from there the defendant must raise a 
constitutional challenge on the use of the technology.391 After the long 
process of the initial trial, there may be an appeal.392 However, many, if not 
most, defendants enter into a plea deal.393 If the defendant does not enter 
into a plea deal, then he likely waives his right to an appeal.394 If this is the 
case, an appellate decision is unlikely and will only arise in rare cases.395 
From there, the appellate decision must be published to become a 
precedential decision.396 At that point, if the defendant appeals, the 
Supreme Court may not even take the case, and if it does, a decision will 
not be rendered until years after the circuit courts have addressed the 
issue.397 
This ultimately leads to judicial rulemaking on the basis of now 
outdated technology and outdated factual records. In a state of current 
changing technology and the use of facial recognition technology that 
subjects American citizens to violations of privacy, comprehensive and 
detailed legislative rules that project for future violations are needed to 
ensure expectations of privacy. 
b.  Flexibility 
The second institutional advantage of legislative rules is that 
legislatures have the capability of enacting rules quickly and additionally 
hold the derivative advantage of amending rules quickly.398 This advantage 
allows for legislatures to ensure the balance of privacy rights against law 
enforcement needs for the investigative technology with newly arising 
circumstances and variations of technology. 
Technology and the use of new and varying forms of technology 
requires governing bodies to act quickly to ensure privacy protections.399 
But, in order to ensure the intended balance among privacy rights and law 
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up with technological change.400 Legislatures are capable of experimenting 
with different rules and have the ability to make frequent amendments to 
the law.401 For example, the ECPA enacted in 1986 amended the Wiretap 
Act.402 The ECPA itself has been further amended eleven separate times.403 
While some amendments brought about large change and others smaller 
technical amendments, the same goal was maintained: balancing privacy 
interests and government’s need to stop crime.404 
It should be noted that this argument is criticized by some privacy 
scholars, most notably Professor Solove.405 Professor Solove argues that 
judicial rules can be just as flexible, comprehensive, and detailed as 
legislative rules.406 Solove argues that judicial rules under the Fourth 
Amendment are balanced and detailed because, once the Court finds an 
action deserves protection, the Court lays down specific rules to regulate 
the particular search and seizure.407 The balance struck between privacy 
rights and law enforcement needs is accomplished through the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.408 Professor Solove goes further to 
suggest that in situations where warrants do not work well, the Court has 
crafted specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as with Terry 
stops, “special needs,” and exigent circumstances.409 
Professor Solove’s arguments are compelling in some Fourth 
Amendment situations, but his arguments lose support in the context of 
governmental use of facial recognition technology. At the outset, the 
proposed statutory act that regulates governmental use of facial recognition 
technology is far more detailed than simply requiring a standard warrant 
supported by probable cause. Instead, the proposed statutory act provides 
other requirements, such as requiring periodic reports to an overseeing 
judge about law enforcement efforts in conducting the surveillance. It is the 
other requirements, in addition to the warrant provision, that ensure the 
balance among privacy rights and law enforcement needs. It is true that, in 
theory, the Court could craft a verbose and detailed opinion that laid out 
every single specific guideline for governmental use of facial recognition 
technology, but is the Court prepared to do so? For one, American citizens 
and law enforcement would be required to wait around until the perfect case 
finally arose to the Supreme Court, and only then, the Court would still 
have to go out of its way to draft comprehensive guidelines for addressing 
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governmental use of facial recognition technology. This will take years, at 
best, leaving privacy rights in limbo.  
Governmental use of facial recognition technology, moreover, is 
dissimilar to the exceptions to the warrant requirement that are argued by 
Professor Solove. In other words, governmental use of facial recognition 
technology is a circumstance where a warrant must be required, not like 
exigent circumstances or “special needs,” where either the lesser standard 
of reasonable suspicion or no warrant at all are required. This is certain 
because the Supreme Court, for over the course of fifty years, has 
maintained that generally a warrant is required to wiretap a suspect’s 
telephone. If a warrant is required to wiretap a person’s telephone, there can 
be no doubt then that a warrant should be required to compile a 
comprehensive database of an individual’s biometric data, effectively 
establishing the person’s location and actions for every second of every 
day. 
Another lingering issue with judicial rules is that courts are strongly 
limited by stare decisis.410 With technology constantly changing and 
growing in its capabilities, legislatures are the appropriate governing body 
for drafting comprehensive statutory law to protect American citizens 
against unregulated facial recognition technology use. 
c.  Legislative Information Surplus  
Third, legislatures have the advantage of crafting legislative rules 
based on a wide range of input provided from parties arguing differing 
opinions that allows legislatures to create the most well-balanced rules.411 
Legislative rules tend to be crafted from inputs and information taken from 
legislature hearings, poll results, advocacy by interest groups, and other 
arenas.412 With the case at hand, drafting a well-balanced and intricate set of 
rules requires a comprehensive understanding of the underlying 
technological facts.413 Legislatures have the ability to receive and discuss 
this information due to the wide range of inputs.414 Courts, on the other 
hand, are limited to a brief factual record, narrow arguments, and short oral 
arguments.415 
These three institutional advantages allow for the legislature to 
create a well-balanced and nuanced rule that is capable of accounting for a 
variety of information, differing views, and is capable of being amended if 
need be. These advantages ensure the proper balance between privacy 
rights against law enforcement needs. 
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CONCLUSION  
As sophisticated technology continues to advance, and as time 
carries on, unregulated governmental use of facial recognition technology 
will continue to invade the secrecies of our daily lives, creating an all-
encompassing picture of our movement, actions, and relationships. This 
note has strived to raise awareness to these issues, while putting a face to 
current law enforcement practices both nationally and internationally. At a 
minimum, such unregulated use of facial recognition technology is an 
unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and 
American citizens deserve protection. But an appropriate factual case 
raising this issue is at best, years away, and it is unknown as to whether the 
Court would be prepared to lay down comprehensive guidelines for 
regulated governmental use of facial recognition technology. This note has 
sought to explain how a comprehensive statutory act, founded upon key 
provisions of the Wiretap Act, would provide clear guidelines and standards 
for judges and law enforcement officers. The proposed act would 
additionally establish a much-needed balance between privacy rights and 
law enforcement needs. Above all, one thing remains certain: the time to act 
is now, Congress. 
 
 
